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10 
Minna Vuohelainen 
The concentrationary universe: Primo Levi’s spatial consciousness 
 
The spaces of the Holocaust 
 
“I’ve always thought that bridges are the most beautiful work there is,” remarks Tino 
Faussone in Primo Levi’s 1978 book The Wrench (La chiave a stella).1 Levi’s rigger-
protagonist appreciates bridges because “they’ll never do anybody harm; in fact, they do 
good, because roads pass over bridges, and without roads we would still be like savages. In 
other words, bridges are sort of the opposite of boundaries, and boundaries are where wars 
start.”2 The nomadic Faussone enjoys seeing the world while “going from one construction 
site to another,” appreciating the diversity of the planet: “the world is beautiful because it’s 
all different.”3 Typically working at interstitial places such as shorelines, riverbanks, or on an 
offshore oil rig that is “like an island, but . . . an island we had made,” Faussone is a “Homo 
faber” who finds meaning in work performed well: for Faussone, the rigger’s wrench is also a 
key to the stars whose dust he finds on top of the tall constructions he has helped to erect.4 A 
celebration of the “freedom” attainable from “being good at your job and therefore taking 
pleasure in doing it”, Faussone demonstrates Levi’s argument that freedom means “not 
having to work under a boss.”5 
 Bridges and boundaries--freedom and spatiality--are also central to Levi’s Holocaust 
testimony. Ever since Theodor Adorno’s often misunderstood 1951 statement that “[t]o write 
poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric,” studies of the Nazi genocide have typically approached 
testimonial literature from the perspective of the impossibility of representing trauma, the 
notorious ineffability of the Holocaust.6 This “linguistic turn” has, to an extent, hindered 
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alternative attempts to understand what happened in the camps. The spatial dynamic of the 
Nazi genocide is one element of the Holocaust that has thus far received limited scholarly 
attention: as Andrew Charlesworth notes in his pioneering essay, “geographers have 
neglected the Shoah,” while literary critics, as Dalia Kandiyoti observes, tend to conceive of 
the spaces of the Holocaust in terms of absence and erasure--as “[v]acuums and voids.”7 Yet, 
as Alberto Giordano, Anne Kelly Knowles and Tim Cole argue in their innovative recent 
study Geographies of the Holocaust, the Holocaust was in fact “a profoundly geographical 
phenomenon” that “destroyed communities, displaced millions of people from their homes, 
and created new kinds of places where prisoners were concentrated, exploited as labor, and 
put to death in service of the Third Reich’s goal to create a racially pure German empire.”8 
Trevor J. Barnes and Claudio Minca see the Nazi regime’s “obsession” with space resulting 
not so much in a vacuum as in a “dark” “reactionary modernism” that followed acts of 
“deterritorialization”--destruction of communities--with “reterritorialization”--settlement and 
rebuilding in keeping with Nazi spatial theory.9 For Giordano, Knowles and Cole, the Nazi 
state created “a comprehensive geography of oppression” that was “ideologically, racially, 
and economically motivated; explicitly enunciated; and materially implemented at all scales 
of human experience.”10 Mapping this “geography of oppression” involves not only research 
into the spatial logistics of the Holocaust--train routes and the location of the camps--and into 
“territorial ideas such as Lebensraum” that were at the heart of Nazi ideology but also into the 
planning work involved in the construction of “Germanified cities, Jewish ghettos, and 
concentration camps” and into “the material landscapes” that “people created, occupied, 
passed through, and endured.”11 The overwhelming machinery and oppressive spatial 
imagination of the Nazi state must, then, be pitted against the human scale of the Holocaust--
the “mappings, topographies, wanderings, unbidden travels, exiles, and incarcerations” of the 
victims that Kandiyoti sees as characteristic of Holocaust literature.12 
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Giordano, Knowles and Cole’s project of mapping the geographies of the Holocaust is 
part of a wider “spatial turn”--an enquiry into questions of “space, place, and mapping”--in 
the humanities in the aftermath of the Second World War.13 As Robert T. Tally notes, spatial 
questions became increasingly pressing after the war as “the massive movements of 
populations--exiles, émigrés, refugees, soldiers, administrators, entrepreneurs, and explorers--
disclosed a hitherto unthinkable level of mobility in the world” and as “traditional spatial or 
geographic limits were erased or redrawn” due to “the transformational effects of 
postcolonialism, globalization, and the rise of ever more advanced information technologies,” 
which “served to suppress distance while also augmenting one’s sense of place or of 
displacement.”14 The postwar period, thus, “called for a serious rethinking” of the 
teleological tenets of western civilization, which “could not be maintained in the aftermath of 
concentration camps and atomic bombs.”15 The resulting “spatial turn” in social and critical 
theory draws on Henri Lefebvre’s ground-breaking study The Production of Space (1974), in 
which Lefebvre argues that space is “neither a mere ‘frame’ . . . nor a form or container of a 
virtually neutral kind” but a “social morphology,” a socially constructed and manipulable 
product that informs human behavior, and thus a legitimate subject for study: “(Social) space 
is a (social) product” that “can be decoded, can be read.”16 Spatial theorists thus believe that 
analyzing the material spaces of a particular society can help us understand the nature of that 
society and the experience of the people living in it. 
Primo Levi was born in Turin and lived there for his entire life, with the exception of 
his period of imprisonment in Auschwitz in 1944–45. In the essay “My House,” which opens 
Other People’s Trades (L’altrui mestiere, 1985), Levi describes himself as “an extreme case 
of the sedentary person” who yet “harbour[s]” a “never satisfied love . . . for travel,” hinted at 
by “the frequency that a journey appears as a topos” in his writing.17 Discussing his 
“profound relationship” with the “unadorned and functional, inexpressive and solid” house in 
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which he was born and lived his entire life and which sustained “some slight damage” during 
the war, he wryly notes that his “favourite armchair occupie[s] the precise spot where, 
according to family tradition, [he] came into the world.”18 He suspects himself of being “less 
sensitive than the average person to the suggestions and influences of the environment,” and 
yet confesses that he “would suffer like an exile” if he had to live elsewhere.19  
In spite of Levi’s characteristically modest assessment of his spatial consciousness, 
Tally is right to observe that “displaced” individuals are often peculiarly “attuned to matters 
of place.”20 In this essay, I read some of the spatial imagery in Primo Levi’s work in light of 
the analytical framework provided by spatial theory. Drawing on Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth of the Prison (1975), Michel Foucault’s classic study of surveillance and social control 
of deviance in modern society, I begin by examining the dehumanizing world of the 
concentration camps, as represented in Levi’s earliest testimony in If This is Man (Se questo è 
un uomo, 1947, 1958) I chart the attempts to police and crush the deportees through rules, 
regulations and a brutal machinery of categorization, incarceration and fear. I then explore 
instances in If This is a Man and Moments of Reprieve (Lilít e altri racconti, 1981) in which 
the camp regime is subverted through clandestine “organization” or rare moments of 
humanity, applying Michel de Certeau’s arguments in The Practice of Everyday Life (1984) 
to a recent analysis of “Auschwitz as a city.”21 I briefly discuss the transitory picaresque of 
The Truce (La tregua, 1963) before concluding with an analysis of Levi’s attempt at a bird’s-
eye view of the Holocaust in his final book, The Drowned and the Saved (I sommersi e i 
salvati, 1986).  
 
“On the bottom”: the camps 
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In the preface to The Drowned and the Saved, Levi describes the camps as “an extensive and 
complex system which profoundly penetrated the daily life of the country”--a system styled a 
“concentrationary universe” by David Rousset in 1946.22 The Nazis’ grandiose dreams of an 
ordered and methodical Final Solution--embodied in the Carbide Tower in Buna, which Levi 
characterizes as “the insane dream of grandeur of our masters”--have been extensively 
discussed by historians.23 Michael Marrus lists the mainstays of the “camp experience” that 
emerged as a tool of extermination as “the systematic dehumanization of the victims, the 
assembly-line process of mass murder, and the bureaucratic organization on a continental 
scale that brought people from every corner of Europe to be killed.”24 The genocide was as 
comprehensive as it was because of the careful logistics that supplied the network of camps 
with human material. 
 In The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre influentially argues that the spaces in 
which we live are the product of social forces and practices, that “every society . . . produces 
a space, its own space,” which can be analyzed.25 Social space, Lefebvre argues, is a tool of 
“control, and hence of domination, of power,” and influences the ways in which people 
interact with one another.26 In “[v]erticality and great height,” Lefebvre detects “the spatial 
expression of potentially violent power,” of absolute political space.27 This intimidating 
“dominant space,” Lefebvre argues, is “the realization of a master’s project” that transforms 
existing space by introducing, typically, “a rectilinear or rectangular form” that “dominate[s]” 
space by “clos[ing], steriliz[ing], “empt[ying]” it.28 The ceremonial spaces of the Nazi state 
are one example of this kind of overwhelming, intimidating dominant space in which the 
individual is dwarfed into insignificance by the scale, symmetry and height of construction.  
 As Robert T. Tally observes, if “space was both a product and productive” for 
Lefebvre, Michel Foucault suggests that “it produces us, in fact.”29 Foucault analyses 
nineteenth-century urban, penal, medical and military spaces as illustrative of the 
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“disciplinary mechanism” that ensures that “each individual is constantly located, examined 
and distributed” in social space through branding, codification, and spatial exclusion and 
containment.30 Foucault’s most powerful example of the disciplinary “panoptic mechanism,” 
“visible and unverifiable,” is Jeremy Bentham’s model prison the Panopticon, an “enclosed, 
segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are inserted in a fixed 
place, in which the slightest movements are supervised” by “an omnipresent and omniscient 
power,” which, to the powerless prisoner, appears almost godlike.31 Perfect visibility is 
essential to the “disciplinary society” because “a state of conscious and permanent visibility . 
. . assures the automatic functioning of power,” the problematically anonymous, sinister 
social forces that in Foucault’s scheme attempt to control the individual through self-
regulation.32 The citizens of the surveillance society thus become docile and obedient almost 
in spite of themselves. 
The ideal of containment, surveillance and control described by Foucault was, of 
course, carried to an extreme in the Nazi concentration camps. For Levi, the drive to 
destruction within “the concentrationary world” represented “a version, an adaptation of 
German military procedures . . . or, more accurately, its caricature” that followed the 
distorted logic of Nazi social and spatial policies: “inside the Lager, on a smaller scale but 
with amplified characteristics, was reproduced the hierarchical structure of the totalitarian 
state, in which all power is invested from above and control from below is almost 
impossible.”33 Levi’s conclusion that the “world around us was upside down” is, in some 
respects, close to the arguments of Dan Diner that the Nazi system was “counterrational” and 
of Giorgio Agamben that the camps represented “the space that opens up when the state of 
exception starts to become the rule.”34 Paolo Giaccaria and Claudio Minca have recently 
drawn on Agamben’s reading of the camps as thresholds signifying the political space of 
modernity to examine the spatial ambiguities and paradoxes of the Auschwitz complex, while 
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Paul B. Jaskot, Anne Kelly Knowles, Chester Harvey and Benjamin Perry Blackshear 
analyze the spatial dynamics of the development of the Auschwitz complex through the tools 
of Geographic Information Science.35 The site, they note, had been carefully planned as “a 
complex administrative and urban entity” in keeping with “the city-planning strategies of 
Albert Speer and other Nazi urban planners” and with “penal designs extending back through 
Majdanek and Dachau, and beyond to common prison and industrial prototypes.”36 The 
civilian parts of “the camp-city” were dwarfed by the adjacent network of camps, which thus 
dominated the spatial horizon of the area.37 The initial plans for the complex, Jaskot et al. 
note, were clear and logical, “evidenc[ing] a rationalized distribution of function and a clear 
spatial hierarchy,” although their subsequent findings agree with Giaccaria and Minca’s 
reading of the ambiguities of the camp-city.38  
This analysis of Auschwitz as “an urban site” reads well against Levi’s description of 
the complex as “the concentrationary capital,” “as large as a city,” but a city whose citizens 
are slaves.39 Passing through Birkenau after liberation, Levi describes the camp as “a 
boundless metropolis” whose very architecture is intimidating, oppressive and exhausting 
with its “innumerable gloomy, square, grey stone edifices, three floors high, all identical; 
between them ran paved roads, straight and at right angles, as far as the eye could see.”40 The 
extent of the Auschwitz complex, then, comes to Levi as something of a shock, and he 
acknowledges that the role of inmate was “not always a good observation post” for 
deciphering the complex world of the Lager: “overwhelmed by an enormous edifice of 
violence and menace,” the prisoners were prevented from “acquir[ing] an overall vision of 
their universe” and “in no position to evaluate the extent of the slaughter” because their “eyes 
were fastened to the ground by every single minute’s needs.”41 Only privileged inmates could 
command a “better observatory” that “was located higher up and hence took in a more 
extensive horizon”--and the testimony of these Prominenten was not representative, as Levi 
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would later acknowledge.42 Robert Gordon agrees with this assessment that the inmates, 
“who had seen the camps from below and in conditions of extreme deprivation,” could not be 
expected to “kn[o]w the camp world in its every aspect.”43 Levi’s spatial consciousness in his 
earliest testimony provides, therefore, a grassroots perspective. Although he manifests 
remarkable detachment and analytical ability even in Auschwitz Report, coauthored with 
Leonardo de Benedetti almost immediately after liberation, this early testimony looks at the 
Lager from the bottom. 
 In keeping with Foucault’s description of the Panopticon as “a laboratory” that “could 
be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to alter behaviour, to train or correct 
individuals,” Levi describes the camps as “a gigantic biological and social experiment” that 
saw “[t]housands of individuals, differing in age, condition, origin, language, culture and 
customs . . . enclosed within barbed wire” and forced to “live a regular, controlled life which 
[was] identical for all and inadequate to all needs.”44 The system, whose “primary purpose” 
was “shattering the adversaries’ capacity to resist,” did so by pitting the internees one against 
another and by confusing their expectations.45 Levi notes that upon arrival the deportees, who 
had often experienced “years of segregation, humiliations, maltreatments, forced migrations, 
the laceration of family ties, the rupture of contact with the rest of the world,” were 
“desperate, disoriented people, exhausted from the journey, bereft of resistance,” and felt 
themselves in a liminal situation, “on the threshold of the darkness and terror or an unearthly 
space,” when entering the camp.46 The camp’s backward logic confused and disorientated 
them, and people who feel lost are often unable to reason and function. In this abnormal 
world, it was “the normal order of things that the privileged oppress the unprivileged,” and 
the new arrivals’ survival depended on their speedy ability to grasp this “human law” that 
governed the “social structure” of the Lager.47 
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 Levi notes that deportees’ memories of passing through “the famous threshold,” “the 
gate to slavery,” are typically preceded by the image of “the train which marked the departure 
towards the unknown . . . the sealed boxcar changed from a commercial vehicle into an 
ambulatory prison or even an instrument of death.”48 The train takes the deportees, feeling for 
the first time “the ancient grief of the people that has no land,” on “a journey towards 
nothingness, a journey down there, towards the bottom.”49 The train, that representative mode 
of transport of modernity, assumes Charon’s place, conveying them in one uncomfortable 
journey to another world that is “outside the world.”50 As a number of essays in this 
collection note, Levi makes frequent literary references in his testimony, in particular in his 
earliest attempts to represent the spatial logic of the camps. Especially notable are the 
numerous direct and indirect references to Dante’s Divine Comedy, particularly the Inferno.51 
Auschwitz, in these Dantesque references, is “hell,” “the bottom,” “anus mundi, ultimate 
drainage site of the German universe,” lower than which “[i]t is not possible to sink.”52 The 
camp regime of pointless rules, surveillance, brutality and violence, “slave work,” “public 
and collective nudity,” “[m]alnutrition, despoilment, and other physical discomforts,” and the 
banning of “that most precious communication, contact with [the prisoners’] country of 
origin and their family,” is designed to reduce the inmates into docile slaves incapable of the 
least resistance, and in most cases it succeeds.53 In these conditions, Levi writes, “[t]o sink is 
the easiest of matters; it is enough to carry out all the orders one receives, to eat only the 
ration, to observe the discipline of the work and the camp. Experience showed that only 
exceptionally could one survive more than three months in this way.”54 In the upside-down 
world of the camp, Arbeit does not make one frei, nor does an obedient prisoner secure 
privileges. Indeed, the innocent prisoner, often a heroic or admirable figure in western culture 
whose condition of imprisonment is seen as “illegitimate, abnormal: in short, as a disease 
which must be healed by escape or rebellion,” loses his integrity and becomes instead the 
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“demoralised and depleted” Muselmann, one of the drowned, devoid of country and home, 
and thus of identity.55 
 
“No barrier is ever without a flaw”: moments of reprieve 
 
In The Drowned and the Saved, Levi writes that “[s]ome form of reaction” exists in all 
totalitarian regimes.56 Jaskot et al.’s recent analysis reveals that despite the careful planning 
of the Auschwitz complex, “ideal plans, even brutal ones backed by a vast military apparatus, 
are never fully realized.”57 The “rationally planned total environment” of the initial 
“idealized conceptualization” of the camp was out of keeping with “the messy reality of plans 
and buildings that were actualized in fits and starts over time.”58 Instead of a “regimented, 
rational, static” space, Auschwitz appears to have been “a highly unstable, even chaotic, site 
of activity” that is likely to have been “visually confusing.”59 This “spatial confusion” of the 
camp-city may have led to breaches of regulations and to escape attempts.60 
 The French philosopher Michel de Certeau’s analysis of the “spatial practice” of 
walking in the city charts the pedestrian’s ability to subvert panoptic surveillance. While the 
pedestrian may lack an overall cartographic understanding of the space through which he 
moves, his very restlessness simultaneously puts him beyond the panoptic impulse because 
“[t]o walk is to lack a place.”61 If, thus, “one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is 
an anti-nomadic technique,” the pedestrian, with his fragmentary impressions of his 
surroundings, is both the opposite of the “space planner urbanist, city planner or 
cartographer,” and thus the real if unwitting author or “ordinary practitioner” of urban life.62 
De Certeau thus sees pedestrians as potentially subversive figures who can resist and disrupt 
the “totalizing” “panoptic power” of urban planning because walking, “an elementary form” 
of experiencing the city, identifies illegitimate, unmarked routes and itineraries and thus 
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represents a disruptive “delinquent narrativity” that “permits the re-emergence of the element 
that the urbanistic project excluded.”63  
 In the polyglot world of the Lager, Levi’s narrative persona quickly learns that he is 
not “‘à la maison’” and there is “‘kein warum’”: “in this place everything is forbidden, not 
for hidden reasons, but because the camp has been created for that purpose.”64 In the world of 
the camp, the deportees have to learn quickly “that man is bound to pursue his own ends by 
all possible means.”65 Yet Levi agrees that “no barrier is ever without a flaw” and charts 
numerous examples in his work of individuals who were able to resist the totalizing 
experience of the camp--“the few, the different, the ones in whom (if only for a moment) I 
had recognized the will and capacity to react, and hence a rudiment of virtue.”66 Such 
survival depends on a rapid readjustment of the prisoner’s “cognitive mapping” of his place 
within the complex social organism of the camp.67 As Michael Ignatieff notes, these 
individuals retained “the capacity to remain an agent, to have plans, intentions”--the capacity, 
in other words, “for a certain exercise, however tiny, of freedom” within a system designed to 
produce slaves.68 
 The Lager represented a steep learning curve--a perverse “university.”69 As already 
noted, camp discipline had to be resisted or subverted if one were to survive. As Levi and 
Benedetti observed in their Auschwitz Report, the internees were provided with no tools with 
which to perform many of the tasks required of them, and the work set was often of a kind of 
which they had no previous experience.70 In Moments of Reprieve, Levi attempts to explain 
to the saintly new arrival Bandi “that down there, in order to get by, it was necessary to get 
busy, organize illegal food, dodge work, find influential friends, hide one’s thoughts, steal, 
and lie; that whoever did not do so was soon dead.”71 The economy of the Lager, based on a 
“complex network of thefts and counter-thefts” fuelling a “very active” “Exchange Market,” 
represents a grotesque caricature, “a distorting mirror,” of the capitalist economy operating in 
12 
 
the outside world.72 Here, one must learn to complement the “underground art of 
economizing on everything, on breath, movements, even thoughts” with opportunistic and 
persistent theft.73 Above all, “one must always avoid being a nobody” because “[a]ll roads 
are closed to a person who appears useless, all are open to a person who has a function, even 
the most fatuous.”74 Only those who are particularly ruthless or practical or can offer useful 
professional skills or attractive sexual services will survive: “Whosoever does not know how 
to become an ‘Organisator’, ‘Kombinator’, ‘Prominent’ . . . soon becomes a ‘muselman.’”75  
 Many of the “saved” are occupants of what Levi would later term the “gray zone.”76 
They include Templer, “not only a good organizer, but an exceptional soup-eater” because of 
his enviable ability to “empty his bowels at his own desire”; Schepschel, “not very robust, 
nor very courageous, nor very wicked” but good at petty acts of kombinacje; Alfred L., “the 
determined and joyless dominator”; Henri, an attractive homosexual; the illiterate but “very 
ingenious” gypsy Grigo, who “definitely knew his way around” since he has been able to 
smuggle a photograph and a pocket knife into the camp; the vigorous, animalistic dwarf Elias 
Lindzin, “the human type most suited to this way of living” who “has survived the 
destruction from outside, because he is physically indestructible” and “has resisted the 
annihilation from within because he is insane”; and the “admirably armed” and “[s]hrewd, 
violent, and happy” Leon Rappoport, who “lived in the Camp like a tiger in the jungle, 
striking down and practicing extortion on the weak, and avoiding those who were stronger; 
ready to corrupt, steal, fight, pull in his belt, lie, or play up to you, depending on the 
circumstances.”77 Next to the “ancient, incarnate weariness” of the bulk of the internees, the 
“vitality” of men like Rappoport appears to Levi “out of place and insolent” but “not 
despicable or repugnant.”78 These inmates have the agency and the skills to survive in the 
camp environment and are therefore the “fittest” in the extreme Darwinian struggle that 
characterizes the concentrationary universe.79 
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 Although Levi describes himself as “not made of the stuff of those who resist” 
because he is “too civilized,” “thinks too much,” and “use[s] [him]self up at work,” Ignatieff 
is correct to argue that Levi survived not only because of luck, his command of some 
German, and his training as a chemist, but also “because there was something unbreakable 
inside him, a modest, vigilant, capacity to understand what was happening around him and to 
make use of any available resources that came his way. He also showed courage and 
organizational capacity of a high order.”80 Examples of this capacity for “organizing” deals 
include repairing Frau Mayer’s bicycle in exchange for a boiled egg and three lumps of sugar, 
the cerium rods stolen from the laboratory and transformed first into flints and then into 
bread; the “tight bond of alliance” with Alberto “by which every ‘organized’ scrap is divided 
into two strictly equal parts” and which results in a successful business in brooms, files and 
shower tickets, and, perhaps most poignantly, the theft of pipettes, which earned Levi a half-
eaten bowl of frozen soup infected with scarlet fever.81 This final theft, which seemed 
unfortunate, was in fact what saved him in the end, since at the evacuation of the camp he 
was left behind while Alberto, who had immunity and thus did not fall ill, would disappear 
during the death march. Levi’s ability to adapt to his conditions quickly enough, and to 
acquire new modes of behavior appropriate for his new circumstances, are an extreme 
example of de Certeau’s spatial practice, and thus a small breach in the panoptic discipline of 
the camp.  
 Levi writes that only a “very few superior individuals, made of the stuff of martyrs 
and saints,” were able to retain their humanity in the camp “without renunciation of any part 
of [their] moral world.”82 To “resist” the “infernal order,” one needed “a very solid moral 
framework.”83 Another, more positive, group of individuals commemorated in If This is a 
Man and Moments of Reprieve consists of prisoners who were able to resist the totalizing 
experience of the Lager not so much because of their ruthlessness or organizational ability 
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but because of an irrepressible humanity or sense of culture within them. This group of 
individuals resist the Lager by clinging on to culture, “the skeleton, the scaffolding, the form 
of civilization,” and by doing so they refuse to be reduced to the subhuman creatures that 
Nazi racial theory assumes them to be.84 Levi represents this process of resistance in spatial 
terms, referring to “[m]an’s capacity to dig himself in, to secrete a shell, to build around 
himself a tenuous barrier of defence, even in apparently desperate circumstances,” which, he 
claims, is “based on an invaluable activity of adaptation, partly passive and unconscious, 
partly active.”85 This capacity, then, has something in common with the spatial practice of de 
Certeau’s delinquent pedestrian, who resists the totalizing eye of power by navigating the 
urban space in unpredictable ways.  
In the world of the Lager, Levi offers two recurring examples of this resistance as a 
striking contrast to the survival strategies of the Prominenten. One is the consolation 
provided by culture, education and civilization, by the maintenance of some vestige of the old 
life. Examples of this kind of survival include Wolf, “a reserved, dignified man in his 
forties,” whose love for music sustains him and inspires jealousy in the other inmates, and the 
devout Lithuanian Jew Ezra, “heir to an ancient, sorrowful, and strange tradition,” who 
inspires admiration by refusing food on the eve of Yom Kippur.86 It is perhaps best 
exemplified by Levi’s recollections of his attempt to explain the momentous significance of 
the Canto of Ulysses to Pikolo Jean and of the chemical examination, during which his 
“reservoir of knowledge . . . responds at request with unexpected docility,” confirming that he 
is indeed “the B.Sc. of Turin” who had taken his degree “summa cum laude.”87 The second 
humane strategy of survival is the insistence, first articulated by Steinlauf, on the 
maintenance of human dignity against all odds: even if the prisoners are “slaves, deprived of 
every right, exposed to every insult, condemned to certain death,” they still possess the 
“power to refuse [their] consent” to being reduced to “beasts,” and so, Levi agrees,  
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[W]e must certainly wash our faces without soap in dirty water and dry ourselves on 
our jackets. We must polish our shoes, not because the regulation states it, but for 
dignity and propriety. We must walk erect, without dragging our feet, not in homage 
to Prussian discipline but to remain alive, not to begin to die.88  
This maintenance of human dignity is “a symptom of remaining vitality, and necessary as an 
instrument of moral survival.”89 Among the prisoners he remembers as possessing this 
humane vitality are the “brisk” and “alert” Tischler, who “never succumbed to lethargy” and 
who tells stories and sings during moments of rest, and Bandi, with his “unique talent for 
happiness,” an “inborn capacity for joy,” who shrugs off “[o]ppression, humiliation, hard 
work, exile” and whom Levi teaches to steal.90 Above all, however, there are Levi’s friend 
Alberto and the Italian civilian worker Lorenzo. Alberto, “the rare figure of the strong yet 
peace-loving man against whom the weapons of night are blunted,” is introduced as someone 
who is adaptable and practical, a virtuous man who “entered the Lager with his head high, 
and lives in here unscathed and uncorrupted.”91 The Italian civilian worker Lorenzo brings 
Levi soup, which he shares with Alberto, every day for six months, despite the grave danger 
to himself. “In the violent and degraded environment of Auschwitz,” Levi writes, “a man 
helping other men out of pure altruism was incomprehensible, alien, like a savior who’s come 
from heaven”--and, in fact, Levi ultimately credits Lorenzo with his survival, partly because 
of the additional ration of soup, but most of all “for his having constantly reminded me by his 
presence, by his natural and plain manner of being good, that there still existed a just world 
outside our own.”92 Lorenzo’s “pure and uncontaminated” “humanity,” he writes, was 
“outside this world of negation” and thus helped Levi to survive as a human being.93 The 
“miraculous” letter from home, which Levi was able to receive thanks to Lorenzo, 
“represented a breach, a small gap in the black universe that closed tightly around us, and 
through that breach hope could pass.”94 
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Towards the gray zone: an ethics of the borderland 
 
In Levi’s curiously life-affirming message, the “aims of life are the best defence against 
death: and not only in the Lager.”95 Yet Levi viewed his practical ability and his subsequent 
survival with growing unease, noting that while he “felt innocent,” he was nonetheless 
“enrolled among the saved and therefore in permanent search of a justification” since the 
“worst survived” while “the best all died.”96 During the collapse of the camp administration, 
Levi was ill, confined to Ka-Be, because of the scarlet fever he had contracted from the 
infected soup he had purchased with stolen pipettes. “The Story of Ten Days” depicts the 
state of limbo between German flight and the arrival of the Russian troops, a limbo 
characteristically punctuated by reading and reflection and by practical organizational activity 
in search of food and sources of energy. The “sequel” to If This is a Man, The Truce, vividly 
depicts the apocalyptic chaos that characterized not only the abandoned camp, inhabited by 
ghostly, dying inmates, but also postwar Europe, torn apart by “the fearful tragedy” of which 
Levi was a survivor, but which had left “Vienna undone and the Germans broken.”97 
 The “unforgettable” “vagabondage” of The Truce stands, seemingly, in stark contrast 
to the spatial confinement of If This is a Man.98 This is a book of fitful and uncertain “transit” 
as Levi and his compatriots set out on an “interminable and inexplicable journey” from 
Auschwitz, through Eastern Europe, to Italy.99 The book is saturated with images of the 
“immense, heroic space of Russia,” of the “itinerant dwelling” of the “train, with its cargo of 
hope,” and of “the confused vortex of thousands of refugees and displaced persons,” like Sore 
and her sister “abandoning themselves to the wind” “like feathers.”100 The often humorous 
descriptions of intercultural communication and nomadic travel to an extent align this journey 
of transition with the philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s concept of nomadic boundary-crossing as 
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a form of resistance to totalizing state power. Embarking on “an adventure . . . impelled by 
the attraction of movement, of what lies outside,” Deleuze’s nomads resist administrative 
attempts to fix them in space, just as Levi and his companions leave behind the destructive 
order of the camp, but the Italians are returning home.101 However exhilarating some of the 
picaresque descriptions in The Truce, in a poignant commentary on Levi’s anticipation of the 
“inhuman joy” of the return journey near the beginning of If This is a Man, just three of the 
650 deportees on Levi’s convoy return.102 When the train reaches German territory towards 
the end of its circular journey, before it passes through the Brenner, the passengers wonder 
uneasily whether they may not be headed north, back to Auschwitz, after all. Levi’s narrative, 
unlike the train, does come full circle: as Lucie Benchouiha points out, “[w]hat appears to be 
a post-Auschwitz text both begins and ends with its author inside Auschwitz.”103 The 
expansive travelogue of the book, significantly named The Truce--a state of temporary rather 
than permanent peace--is fenced in by Levi’s nightmare that he is “in the Lager once more, 
and nothing is true outside the Lager.”104 This chilling conclusion is one of many “cyclical 
return[s] in Levi’s writing to the issues of his first work of testimony.”105 
 Levi’s final book The Drowned and the Saved is “a work of reflection and 
explanation” produced “[a]t a distance of years.”106 In it, Levi moves from the grassroots 
perspective of If This is a Man towards a more comprehensive analysis of the Holocaust. This 
analysis is most strikingly represented in the spatial image of the Lager as “an intricate and 
stratified microcosm; the ‘grey zone,’” which exists between the victims and the perpetrators, 
its boundaries “ill-defined” and shifting.107 It was the very ambiguity of this “indecipherable” 
world that had confused the already disorientated deportees upon arrival in Auschwitz: 
instead of the “terrible but decipherable world” represented by the “simple model” of “a 
sharply defined geographic frontier” between “us” and “them,” the concentrationary world 
proved incomprehensible because “the enemy was all around but also inside” and instead of 
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“a single frontier” there were “many confused, perhaps innumerable frontiers” that precluded 
any hope of finding “solidarity” amongst “companions in misfortune.”108 This ambiguous 
space, Levi insists, is “never” “empty,” but its very crowdedness tells us uncomfortable truths 
about humankind.109 The “confused creature” that is man, Levi writes, “becomes even more 
confused . . . when he is subjected to extreme tensions: he then eludes our judgment, the way 
a compass needle goes wild at the magnetic pole.”110 Levi insists that “the greatest 
responsibility” for the existence of such a zone of ethical ambiguity rests with “the very 
structure of the totalitarian state,” because “regimes based on terror and obsequiousness” 
have a tendency to corrupt their victims.111 To judge the citizens of the gray zone is difficult 
even if one has lived in “a state of coercion” oneself.112  
 The radical ethical uncertainty of the Lager is conveyed spatially, in keeping with the 
notion of Auschwitz as a “chronotope” bringing together recollection and geography.113 At a 
remove of forty years, Levi’s conception of the gray zone thus accords well with Michelle 
Balaev’s contention that “place is not only a physical location of experience, but also an 
entity that organizes memories, feelings, and meaning because it is the site where individual 
and cultural realities intersect.”114 The “ethics of the ‘borderland’” that Levi creates in his 
final book appears even to swallow up himself, as he is one of the survivors, “who by their 
prevarications or abilities or good luck did not touch bottom.”115 In spite of his final 
insistence that “the survivors . . . are not the true witnesses,” Levi’s body of work constitutes, 
of course, a significant testimonial narrative.116  Narrative, spatial theory suggests, is “a form 
of world-making” as much as “a mode of world-representing.”117 For Neil Levi and Michael 
Rothberg, “Auschwitz demands to be theorized in terms of heterogeneous, disjunctive 
space.”118 If the concentrationary universe was built on principles of othering, codification, 
separation and segregation, it is, then, significant that while Levi’s testimony is spatially 
articulate, it resists a totalizing cartography of the Lager. In the end, Levi’s “still, small 
19 
 
voice” attests to the ambiguous, hybrid ethics of the liminal “gray zone” in opposition to the 
absolute distinctions of his former oppressors.119 
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